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Autopoiesis is normally considered to be the systems theory in law.  In this paper complexity 
theory is presented as an alternative systems approach.  In order to position complexity 
theory as a plausible alternative to autopoiesis I discuss the differing understanding of 
boundary within each theory, and use this as a vehicle to critique autopoiesis.  My critique is 
situated within systems theory thinking but is external to both autopoiesis and complexity 
theory (although I must oscillate between the two object of critique).  Because both 
approaches possess an understanding of boundary it provides an effective tool to contrast 
their differences, while permitting each to be described in its own language.  It is argued that 
complexity theory offers an approach to boundaries as contingent, emergent, interfaces, 
which the autopoietic construction of boundary can learn from in several ways.  More 
generally it is suggested that the complexity theory approach to boundaries offers lawyers 




Exploring System Boundaries 
Thomas E. Webb 
INTRODUCTION 
In this article I critique legal autopoiesis through complexity theory.
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  While both accounts 
represent systems theory understandings of law and the social, and thus bear a familial 
resemblance to one another, they present unique views.  It is proposed to examine these 
differing accounts by contrasting their respective understandings of boundary, and use this as 
a vehicle to illuminate some limitations to the use of autopoietic theory in law.  I do not 
intend to map out a specific theory of complexity for law, which I and others have done 
elsewhere (Murray, 2008; Ruhl 2008; Vermeule 2012; Webb, 2005), but instead wish to draw 
primarily on the abstract ideas of complexity which I argue have use in law.  The link to law 
is indirect, speaking specifically to legal autopoiesis, and how it deals with boundary, in 
comparison to the complexity approach.  Additionally, while the concept of boundary is 
certainly shared by each approach, most likely because of their related history as systems 
theories, it is experienced differently in each.  Consequently, it should not be viewed as 
merely a concept in common between the two approaches.  I draw on three features of the 
complexity theory understanding of boundary, specifically its contingent, emergent, 
interfacing nature, and contrast these with autopoiesis.  It should be noted that the relative 
under-examination of complexity theory approaches in law means that this paper only 
represents a first foray into the relationships between autopoiesis and complexity theory.   
While my critique remains internal to systems theory thinking in general it is, by necessity, 
external to both autopoiesis and complexity theory.  Having said this, critique must oscillate 
between its external vantage and object (and here to complicate matters there are two 
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objects).  However, in running between, towards, and away from the horizon of one or the 
other ‘in a frenzied attempt to see more’ of each, it will miss what is behind as its field of 
vision narrows (Philippopoulos-Mihalpoulos, 2010, pp.24-25, p.54; see also Cilliers, 2005a, 
pp. 606, 608).  As a consequence of my position as observer, there exists the possibility that 
elements of each approach may be lost, either in the oscillation or the translation; I do not 
think that this can be avoided.  This is a problem which both approaches appreciate too, and 
which I accept as an unavoidable consequence of placing necessary limits on an 
investigation; indeed, it is the quintessential consequence of boundary drawing (Preiser and 
Cilliers, 2010, p.276).  In recognising this problem my argument may avoid, as far as is 
possible given autopoietic self-referentiality, the charge of ‘not engaging with the theory, but 
only with [my] own (inadequate) observations of the theory’ (King, 2001, p.31).  
Although a focus on locating the differences between the two theories via a critique of one by 
the other is inherently divisive, this should not be taken to mean that I deny the utility of 
autopoiesis as an analytical tool.  My goal is not to suggest that autopoiesis is useless, nor 
that complexity theory holds all the answers.  Instead, I argued that we should consider 
whether the autopoietic approach is always the most appropriate, that complexity theory 
offers an alternative analytical perspective, and that the introduction of elements of a 
complexity approach into autopoietic theory may permit the former to rectify some of the 
perceived shortcomings of the latter, and vice versa.  Essentially, it must be accepted from the 
outset that ‘no single method will yield the whole truth’ when dealing with contingent, 
emergent, complex social phenomena (Cilliers, 1998, p.23).  While it is undeniably the case 
that there is common ground between autopoiesis and complexity theory, and while the 
uncovering of these similarities would likely be of benefit to both approaches (for the 
possible beginnings of this process see Webb, 2005), there is a staunchly embedded 




Although boundary is a feature common to both approaches, it is experienced differently in 
each; before proceeding it is worth sketching these for reference.  The complexity theory 
approach to boundaries views them as contingent, emergent interfaces between internal and 
external.  Contingency is the idea that the outcome which occurred, or the conclusion that 
was reached could have happened otherwise, or been decided differently (Cilliers, 1995, 
p.130; 1998, p.106; 2001, p.145; 2008, p.46).  An argument based on emergence holds that 
the characteristics of the whole cannot be derived from knowledge of its parts alone, but 
instead can only be revealed by considering the interactions between those parts (Cilliers, 
1998, pp.1-2).  Thus, the whole is said to be greater than the sum of its parts, such that the 
whole, comprised of many interacting parts, possesses characteristics which are not 
necessarily present in any of its constituent parts alone (Richardson, 2004, pp.76-77); the 
characteristic only comes about as a consequence of interaction.  The notion of boundary as 
an interface builds on the idea of boundary as emergent and contingent.  The idea of an 
interface suggests that the role of the boundary is to facilitate and link interaction between the 
internal and the external (Cilliers, 2001, p.141).  The purpose of the boundary under a 
complexity theory approach is not to offer a definitive construction of anything, but is instead 
to give form to the contingent, emergent frameworks of understanding individuals use to 
‘anticipate the world’ (Waldrop, 1994, p.177; original idea in Holland, 1995, pp.31-34), and 
aid the act of interfacing these accounts with others as they engage in the ‘agnostics of the 
network’ (Cilliers, 1998, p.120).  This engagement is important because without it how is an 
observer or system able to differentiate and give meaning their account; their ‘narratives only 
make sense in terms of the contrast or difference with their surroundings’ (Cilliers, 1995, 
p.128; see also 1998, p.116). 
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The autopoietic approach conceives of boundaries as the line distinguishing inside from 
outside, but also as a tool to connect one and the other; the precise configuration of the 
boundary is particular to each self-referential system.  The connection between inside and 
outside is intimate, defined by the paradox ‘I am what I am because I am what I am not’, the 
unity of difference (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.67).  The system only knows the 
nature of its boundary based on an internally constructed awareness of what is beyond it.  The 
self-referentiality of the system means that the whole process of constructing the environment 
is an elaborate charade, ‘an illusion by and for the system’ to allow it to function 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.81).  The system constructs everything, including its 
boundary with the environment and the environment itself internally through the recursive 
application of the system’s operative code to itself ‘reproducing communication by 
communication’ (Luhmann, 1992a, p.1424; see also 1988a).  This process represents only a 
simulation of ‘the difference between self and other … by the system within itself’, which 
creates merely a ‘blind simulacra of an outside’ inside (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, 
pp.79-80).Thus, in any assessment of either inside or outside what the observer witnesses is 
one being ‘momentarily thrown forward’ relative to the other internally (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.41 see also p.43).  The boundary aids the recognition generated 
through difference, of understanding the inside relative to the outside. 
CONTINGENCY 
Here, contingency relates to the assessment of the location of the boundary, as to whether or 
not the boundary has been determined correctly by an observer or system.  In particular, from 
a complexity approach perspective, it is concerned with the effect that the context of the 
observer or system has on the determination of the boundary.  In a legal setting, the meaning 
of words, the intentions of judges and legislators, and the precise context of the case are all 
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open to interpretation, they are all affected by context (see Webb, 2005, pp.237-238).  The 
reasons for the possibility of divergent outcomes/decisions relate to the importance of context 
in making choices, such that altering context changes the observer’s perspective (for e.g. the 
legislator or judge’s perspective) leading them to draw different conclusions (see further 
Cilliers, 2010, p.16).  Similarly, there are limits to what each individual holding such a 
perspective can know about the social world, and thus being in possession of varied 
information, or choosing to interpret the same information differently will lead to divergent 
perspectives, and a consequent alteration to the decision or outcome “do” (on provisional and 
local knowledge see Richardson, et al, 2001a, p.12; see also Webb, 2005, pp.235, 241).  This 
can manifest as different advocates advancing alternative lines of reasoning in the same case, 
based on privileged conversations with their client not accessible to their counterparts.  More 
abstractly, the particular personal history of each advocate or judge will impart upon them 
unique information, resulting in personal lines of reasoning.  Furthermore, the product of 
changing context “c” or knowledge “k” should not be thought of as easily derivable in terms 
of c + k = do, as this implies a simplistic, linear relationship between c, k, and do; when, as is 
discussed in a moment, this relationship must be an emergent one.  Therefore, the boundary 
under a complexity approach can be thought of as contingent because, had an alternative 
perspective been in play, a different account of boundary would have been given. 
The notion of contingency appears in both autopoiesis and complexity theory (for e.g. in 
complexity see Cilliers, 2001, p.145; in autopoiesis see King and Schütz, 1994, p.271), 
however it occurs at different levels within each.  Under a complexity theory approach 
contingency requires us to question not just the assumptions made about the location of a 
given boundary, but also the foundations of those assumptions.  Conversely, autopoiesis 
offers a more confined understanding of the concept, where contingency relates to the idea 
that what has been given as the boundary assessment could have been otherwise, but operates 
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under the wider assumption that functional differentiation is an appropriate means of 
determining the boundary.  I now want to explore the occurrence of contingency in 
complexity theory and autopoiesis as it relates to (un)certainty and (dis)agreement about the 
position of the boundary. 
(UN)CERTAINTY 
Boundaries in complexity theory are neither singular nor in their multiplicity ever 
concretised.  Rather, there are a countless understandings of any given boundary being 
advanced constantly by participating elements of the social, always in a state of becoming 
(Cilliers, 2001, pp.140, 146).  This is because the position of the observer or system making a 
boundary assessment is contingent, rather than just the outcome they propose being so.  
Judgments about boundary are made in a situated context, on the basis of limited, ‘unevenly 
distributed’ knowledge (Webb, 2005, p.235; and see Cilliers, 1998, pp.4, 92).2  The fact that 
knowledge is relevant (for example to do with law) is not enough to bring it within the 
system (cf. King, 1993, p.223; 2009, p.72; Luhmann, 1989, pp.141-142; 1992a, pp.1427-
1428; Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.88).  Instead, the whole process of constructing 
the boundary needs to be thought of as ‘provisional [and]… local’ (Richardson, et al., 2001a, 
p.12).  As a consequence, a boundary assessment can only ever offer a ‘partial’ view of the 
whole (Richardson, et al., 2001a, p.9), and so may miss out information that subsequently 
alters the meaning significantly (Cilliers, 2007, p.161).  Thus no individual judgment will 
deal with every aspect of the law in a given area, nor will it necessarily make clear the 
legality of action in every circumstance within the limited scope of the case.  It is more likely 
that the case will only apply to its limited context, such that any subsequent application of the 
case in differing circumstances represents an interpretation of the case from a new context, 
requiring the construction of a re-imagined boundary. This does not affect the legitimacy of 
the perspective offered, either in the original or revised instance, because incompleteness 
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does not denote inaccuracy.  However, it does mean that our frameworks for making sense of 
law, always exist ‘in the shadow of the whole’ (Richardson, 2004, p.77; see also Webb, 2005, 
p.232).  The message from complexity is not that it is inappropriate to draw boundaries; 
rather, it is inappropriate to treat those boundaries as the only correct formulation at a given 
time.  We should be less confident about the position of boundaries.  The perspective of 
complexity is not one of ‘anything goes’ (Cilliers, 1998, p.viii), each perspective resides in 
the context of a wider body of law, and of the social, observations and boundary 
constructions can only be understood relative to the wider discourse(s) in which they are 
participating (Cilliers, 1995, p.128).  Outlandish claims are marginalised by the ‘agnostics of 
the network’ (Cilliers, 1998, p.120).  Ultimately, this is a welcome situation for law as it 
invites the continuation of the ‘process of generating understanding’ (Cilliers, 2005b, p.260).  
The recognition that context is central to the construction of boundary allows judges, 
advocates, legislators and citizens to justify their reformulation of precedent. 
Autopoiesis conceptualises the boundary as more clearly (although not always definitively) 
defined, because society is viewed as a system comprised of normatively closed, functionally 
differentiated autopoietic sub-systems (Luhmann, 1989, pp.137-138), maintained by self-
reproduction of themselves, and their boundaries (Luhmann, 1992a, p.1425), on the basis of 
their function (Luhmann, 1992b, p.149).  Law’s function is to maintain legal ‘counterfactual 
expectations’ (Luhmann, 1992a, p.1426), which are expectations held in spite of 
disappointments (breaches of the law) (Luhmann, 1988a, pp.19, 22; 1992a, p.1426), and 
decide on the basis of these expectations whether an action is lawful or unlawful (Luhmann, 
1989, p.140).  In deciding whether expectations have been met or disappointed the 
autopoietic legal system is said to create a space wherein conflicting accounts can be 
proposed and debated (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.68; Torpman, 2003, 90), but it 
would appear in the end that a final, single decision will be reached.  This aspiration towards 
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certainty can be considered by looking at when autopoietic systems know the position of the 
boundary, how the relationship between inside and outside anticipates the determinability of 
the boundary, and finally how the use of coding, and the reliance on functional 
differentiation, suggest the existence of only a limited form of self-produced contingency, 
pointing to an enhanced degree of certainty about the boundary. 
The reader will recall the earlier discussion of limitations caused by the focus of critique.  
That idea has some relevance here too.  For autopoiesis, the contingency of the decision as to 
the location of the boundary appears to exist prior to, and after the decision, but not at the 
moment of decision itself.  Thus, while there is a distinction to be made between inside and 
outside it seems fleeting, such that if one locates the inside/outside distinction in one place, 
then it has likely been mislaid elsewhere.  Similarly, to turn away from the now-established 
distinction and to look elsewhere for another suggests that the observer will no longer know 
the position of the old boundary definitively, because it resides in the observer’s blind spot; 
the observer is confined by the ‘limits of the eye’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.13).  
Consequently, beforehand a form of contingency exists because the problem posed is being 
debated in law, there is no settlement.  But the absence of a settlement in perpetuity would 
render the legal system ineffective, pointless; it must give an answer.  Thus, in the instant that 
the observer or system focusses on the boundary’s position it can be sure of its position, 
because it is looking at it.  However, in turning away it moves into the blind spot, the position 
of the boundary was known in the past, but where it is now becomes unclear.  In the limited 
moment that the boundary is observed, the autopoietic approach appears to suggest that some 
sort of certainty temporarily crystallises for law, and perhaps also across society (where 
certainty is reflected through its reconstruction in other sub-systems).  In complexity theory 
the moment of certainty never crystallises.  Where the boundary is drawn is unique to the 
individual assessing it in a limited context on the basis of the knowledge they possess.  Such 
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an individual will never accurately determine the position of the boundary because they are 
not omnipotent, and they are aware of this.  They will be uncertain about the method used in 
the prior discussion, they will be unsure of the answer produced, and when they turn away 
they may even be unclear about what they turned away from.  In the moment they only 
recognise the unavoidable requirement to make a decision, and so must pretend certainty 
((Richardson, et al, 2001a, p.16; 2001b, p.44). 
The intimate relationship between inside and outside in autopoiesis, experienced through the 
unity of difference over the boundary, builds on the issues surrounding blind spots discussed 
above.  The intimacy in difference between inside and outside is encapsulated in the notion 
that ‘Law’s environment is everything to which the legal code does not presently apply.’  
What is not of law now, may yet cross into law in the future; ‘what is environment presently 
can always become of the system’, and vice versa (see Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, 
p.80).  This should be read alongside the notion of re-entry whereby the internal construction 
of the environment re-enters the system from within (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2006, 
p.226; King, 2009, pp.79-82).  As such, where it might previously have been thought that the 
legal system interprets external events as legal, bringing them into the system, this is an 
inaccurate representation of the autopoietic process.  Everything, even external noise, is an 
internal creation of the system (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.88; Bankowski, 1996, 
p.75).  Therefore, it is more accurate to say of the autopoietic legal system that what is legal 
is ‘latently already in’ the system (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.88; see also King, 
1993, p.223; 2009, p.72; Luhmann, 1989, pp.141-142; 1992a, pp.1427-1428), such that all 
legal events happen within the legal system, they are never beyond it.  The intimate 
relationship between inside and outside is really an ‘internal crossing’ (Philippopoulos-




The idea of internal crossing can be connected to a form of contingency which suggests that 
the creation of a space for disagreement inside the system (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 
2010, p.68; Torpman, 2003, 90), to simulate the position of the legal system in discussion 
with other systems.  There is the creation here of the possibility that hypothetical dormant 
elements of the legal system could become active in the light of system developments.  The 
legal system’s code can be used to simulate these possibilities, to process the information and 
render an image of the boundary.  This implies that the autopoietic legal system is able to 
access all information necessary to answer questions about legal/illegal all the time, 
regardless of location (implied in Luhmann, 1992b, p.181).  This sentiment suggests that the 
boundary can be determined, and will continue to be identifiable to the system, because it can 
conceive of its own hypothetical latent elements as future possibilities that are already 
somehow within its being.  Thus, a weak form of contingency exists, in a controlled, self-
produced, expected way. 
In addition to the binary code, the autopoietic approach also relies on functional 
differentiation as a method to structure its view of society.  I said earlier that under a 
complexity approach contingency is pervasive; relating not just to the contingency of the 
outcome but also to the process which generated it.  Consequently, the complexity approach 
tends not to stipulate that a specific methodology be adopted for its application, suggesting 
instead that it should be thought of as a set of tools which the user can adapt to their 
particular purpose (Walby, 2007, p.456).  This understanding acknowledges that a single 
means of employing a complexity approach would encounter problems as it was applied to an 
increasing number and variety of questions (although see discussion of the London School of 
Economics complexity lexicon project in Richardson et al., 2001a, p.11).  Moreover, the 
contingency which saturates the complexity approach must, on its own terms, acknowledge 
the impossibility of creating a standardised way of thinking complexly.  It is argued that one 
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must instead approach these questions ‘playfully’ allowing for ‘different avenues of advance, 
different viewpoints’ and so on (Cilliers, 1998, p.23).  This entails the acknowledgement that 
it is impossible ‘to tell a single and exclusive story about something that is really complex’ 
(Cilliers, 1998, p.viii). 
The autopoietic approach acknowledges, to an extent that the ultimate process relied on for 
the production of boundaries, functional differentiation, is itself the product of a contingent 
choice.  It is recognised that ‘the legal system originates in the arbitrary point when society 
became functionally differentiated’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, pp.67-68; see also 
Luhmann, 1989, p.139; 1992a, p.145), but this is acknowledged more as a matter of 
practicality than contingency.  It is said that ‘just as any other system, the law requires 
distinction in order to be observed as a system’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.68; 
see also King, 2006, p.41), which suggests that, arbitrary or not, the distinction had to be 
made so that things could be said by the observer.  Thus, while autopoiesis acknowledges 
contingency within its own descriptions, the nature of this decision is not to do with things 
being decided on the basis of something other than functional differentiation, but instead that 
the particular outcome of functional differentiation could itself have been otherwise. 
The autopoietic approach makes claims to have considered the uncertainty generated by 
contingency, but it frames the meaning of contingency and uncertainty in a limited way.  
However, viewed from the perspective of the complexity approach, contingency suggests the 
position of the boundary is unknowable, whether it is in the blind spot or right in front of the 
observer.  It is also argued in the autopoietic approach that the relationship between inside 
and outside, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the creation of a space to entertain 
possibility permits not just the existence of contingency, but also the management of 
contingency.  The complexity theory approach argues that contingency cannot be managed in 
such a way that the boundary can be discerned, that is not the essence of what contingency 
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entails.  The idea that contingency can be contained at a certain level of reasoning is 
encapsulated in the assumption that functional differentiation is appropriate, and that its use 
did not involve a contingent choice being made.  The code and functional differentiation 
display only a limited self-awareness of contingency, leading to a misplaced certainty about 
the position of the boundary. 
The complexity approach accepts the need to draw boundaries for the purposes of analysis 
(Cilliers, 2001, p.141; 2005a, p.606), however it must be acknowledged that one is never 
certain about those boundaries.  Instead they are always in flux and must ‘be continually 
revised’ because ‘boundaries… cannot be identified objectively, finally and completely’ 
(Cilliers, 2005a, p.612).  Whereas in autopoiesis contingency relates only to the idea that 
what has been decided could have been otherwise, in complexity it extends beyond this to the 
framework on which the decision is based.  It is not that this perspective argues that 
functional differentiation is an inappropriate way of conceptualising the social, nor that it 
might have the right answer.  It is the absence of reflection on the contingency of the whole 
edifice which the complexity approach reveals.  To say that the choice of functional 
differentiation was arbitrary, or that the description of the legal system as an autopoietic 
system is arbitrary is unsatisfactory (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, pp.67-68); the 
autopoietic approach needs to delve into the contingency discussed above (previous 
comments are insufficient see Luhmann, 1997, p.43). 
(DIS)AGREEMENT 
Closely related to the type of certainty (or contingency minimisation and containment) 
proposed by the autopoietic approach to boundary in specific instances, is an absence or 
suppression of the possibility of disagreement about its more general structure.  A complexity 
approach understanding of the social consists of many competing, provisional accounts.  This 
understanding makes space for the possibility of disagreement as to the appropriate 
14 
 
boundaries of, in this case, law.  This means that conflicting decisions about the boundary of 
the legal system, even where they are mutually exclusive, will not cause the unravelling of 
the legal system; indeed, a complexity approach finds the notion of a single legal system 
difficult to comprehend.  While there is a system of processes which society labels as the 
legal system, the proper purview of that system (the location of the boundary) remains 
perpetually in question.  Under a complexity approach the boundary of the system should be 
thought of as ‘a function of the activity of the system itself, and a product of the strategy of 
description involved’ (Cilliers, 2001, p.141).  Thus, each observer operating under a 
complexity approach will, while accepting the existence of a given set of processes (for e.g. 
legal processes such as judicial review proceedings), produce their own contingent boundary 
assessments of the proper limits of the system, essentially defining the legal system in an 
infinite variety of ways.   
Autopoiesis seems to operate in the opposite direction.  I have already discussed that the 
appropriateness of functional differentiation is presumed under the autopoietic approach, or 
that the contingency of the choice does not appear to have been addressed in detail.  Drawing 
on functional differentiation as the basic framework for boundary construction leads the 
autopoietic approach to begin with the presumption that certain systems can be defined.  As 
such, whereas complexity theory posits a multiplicity of accounts of the legal system (some 
of which will question the label “legal system” itself), autopoiesis begins from the position of 
there being one account of the legal system which is then rendered into other systems, and 
also the legal system’s self-image construct.  More accurately, this account is known only in 
its full sense to the legal system itself, while all other systems attempt an internalised 
reconstruction of the legal system as part of their efforts to build a picture of the environment.  
The possibility of disagreement about the boundary of any given system is therefore expected 
and accommodated in the complexity approach, whereas it may cause some difficulty in 
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autopoiesis.  For example, in looking for concrete counterfactual expectations produced by 
the system’s autopoietic processes (Luhmann, 1988b, pp.344, 347), problems arise when 
conflicting expectations are produced.  Although it may be possible to manage these 
disagreements internally in ‘a space in which the problem of the law is set up as a question’ 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.68), this method appears to be artificially contained 
by the autopoietic framework.  The autopoietic approach is forced to construct the notion of 
disagreement about the proper boundaries of sub-systems within individual systems, because 
anything to do with law is already part of the legal system, politics with the political system, 
economics with the economic system and so on.  The disagreement seems then to become 
somewhat irrelevant; where is the route around disagreement between sub-systems to 
resolution?  There is only more self-reference.  While I do not deny that the framework 
offered by autopoiesis deals with the problem, I do not think it does so satisfactorily in 
contrast to the complexity approach, which exists on the basis of on-going discussion 
(Cilliers, 1998, p.120).  Having said this, I cannot see a means of overcoming the issue using 
the present framework of autopoietic thought which does not require either the outright 
abandonment of functional differentiation as the sole methodology, or at least the creation 
and exploration of the possibility of disestablishment. 
In the complexity approach accommodation of disagreement is achieved by the acceptance of 
the likelihood of varied boundaries, the recognised contestability of boundary conclusions, 
and the provision of a process for the management of disagreement through the ‘agnostics of 
the network’ (Cilliers, 1998, p.120).  Thus, uncertainty about the position of the boundary is 
accepted, and disagreement is presumed.  In contrast, autopoiesis seeks unity through the 
reduction of internal difference (Luhmann, 1988b, p.339), and appears to relegate the role of 
contingency to merely part of the processes stemming from functional differentiation rather 
than a critical tool to reflect on the theory as a whole.  The complexity approach demonstrates 
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that autopoiesis must re-examine the role of contingency.  The autopoietic approach would 
benefit from looking behind the paradoxes and arbitrary selections which hide functional 
differentiation from contingency.  To try to manage the possibility of conflict as a completely 
internal process is also to ignore the existence of other valid understandings of the legal 
system not originating in the legal system itself, yet which are relevant to it, something which 
complexity theory is unwilling to do (Cilliers, 1998, p.122; Richardson and Midgley, 2007, 
p.176; cf. Castellani and Hafferty, 2009, p.61).  One need only recognise that law would often 
benefit from the consideration of alternative constructions of law posited by non-legal 
sources, however the autopoietic approach makes such a consideration difficult.  The 
complexity theory approach’s conception of contingency may offer pathways to alternative 
constructions, and mechanisms for seeing past these self-constructed paradoxes. 
For complexity theory the demarcation of something as a system can only ever be an exercise 
in drawing a boundary for the purposes of analysis.  What is most appropriately included and 
excluded from a given analytical reality based on complexity thinking is a contingent 
question to be answered by the observer in a particular context.  We cannot determine what 
the real boundary of the system is because no objective boundary definitively exists; or, 
rather, we draw boundaries and perceive systems and organisation in society from a particular 
context (Cilliers, 1995, p.130).  Boundaries do not exist independently of our models; they 
are not tangible and transferable to others (Cilliers, 2002, p.83; 2005a, pp.606-607).  
Autopoiesis acknowledges that its position is contingent too, ‘including its own theoretical 
premises in the contingency of its descriptions’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.68), 
but it appears paradoxically to be able to grasp the location of a boundary with certainty when 
it focuses on it.  Similarly, the complexity approach develops a more plausible means of 
managing disagreement within its framework, whereas it is not entirely clear how the 
autopoietic approach masters fundamental disagreement when the only appropriate 
17 
 
perspective for generating explanations is based on functional differentiation, and internal 
self-reference. 
EMERGENCE 
A critique drawing on emergence is concerned with how boundaries are drawn, and the 
reasoning used to assess them.  Under a complexity approach the boundary is the product of 
numerous perspectives (parts), including that of the system and the observer, as to what the 
boundary should be.  The interaction between various perspectives produces an 
understanding of boundary which can be thought of as ‘both a function of the system and of 
our description strategy’ (Cilliers, 1998, p.4; 2001, p.141; see also Webb, 2005, p.237 and 
n.43 p.237).  Therefore, the boundary is an emergent consequence of our interaction as 
observers with a perceived system. 
This idea can be used to comment on two related, but separate, elements of complexity 
thinking; anti-reductionism and emergentism.  Anti-reductionism is concerned with critically 
reflecting on the observer’s methodology, and the limits of their explanatory capacity (and 
perhaps attempting to account for the issues which arise).  Emergentism is about the 
processes of boundary formation, and is anti-reductionist in that it acknowledges the 
limitations of models (models are how we make sense of the world and have to be limited to 
be manageable and useful), but seeks not to oversimplify the nature of the relationships 
between parts under examination.  An anti-reductionist approach will also tend to possess 
emergentist qualities, because emergentism carries through the thinking of anti-reductionism 
into the constructive element of the theory. An approach to boundaries based on emergentism 
undermines reductionist accounts of systems and their boundaries, by showing that the 
boundary cannot be derived simply by examining the parts of the system in isolation.  It is 
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proposed to first discuss the notion of reductionism, and the different anti-reductionist stances 
of the complexity and autopoietic approaches, and then to offer a critique of autopoiesis 
based on the emergentist perspective of the complexity approach. 
REDUCTIONISM 
The reductionist method seeks to simplify the question being asked through the elimination 
of as many variables as possible such that the environment of the object of observation can be 
controlled, and/or by limiting the number of parts to be observed; it is, in essence, the 
scientific method.  Central to this approach is the proposition that the character of the whole 
(of the way an object will behave under specified circumstances) can be derived from the 
sum of its parts.  Superficially there is nothing wrong about this approach.  In fact, it has been 
highly effective in analysing a wide range of problems in the many areas of research, 
particularly in the natural sciences; however, it has its limitations.  The overriding problem 
with the method is its assumption that the character of the whole can always be revealed 
through an examination of its parts alone, in isolation.  This runs counter to the emergentist 
argument that the whole, particularly when an examination is concerned with complex social 
phenomena, can only be derived through an understanding of the interactions between the 
parts (Cilliers 1998, pp.1-2; Richardson and Cilliers 2001, p.10; Richardson, 2004, pp.76-77; 
Richardson 2005, p.617).  From the interaction between parts it is argued that characteristics 
not necessarily present in any of the parts may arise (Vermeule, 2012, p.9). 
Both the complexity and autopoietic approaches offer an anti-reductionist position, but they 
are not rationalised on the same basis.  Each approach argues that society is incredibly 
complex, both also agree that the process of constructing models to make sense of that 
complexity will act to reduce the complexity of the environment (Philippopoulos-
Mihalopoulos, 2010, pp.68-69; Cilliers, 2002, p.78).  At this point there is some divergence 
between the two positions in relation to how the approaches conceive of their anti-
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reductionism.  On the one hand, proponents of the complexity approach argue that, because 
of the complexity of the social our models could not possibly represent it accurately without 
being ‘at least as complex’ as the object of discussion (i.e. society) (Richardson et al., 2001a, 
p.9).  To put this differently, a theory of everything must contain within itself an account of 
itself as a theory of everything.  This is an impossibility given that to achieve this feat would 
require an infinite amount of resources to retain an infinite number of theories of everything, 
over infinite time horizons within a single model, when the availability of resources (such as 
the physiological capacity of humans to store memories, as well as other physical and 
temporal capacities) is limited (Webb, 2005, n.36 p.236).  Instead we must accept that any 
attempt to model a complex phenomenon will act to distort the observation (Cilliers, 2005a, 
pp.608-609; 2007, p.161), while also accepting that we must make models to offer any kind 
of analysis at all (Cilliers, 2001, p.138; 2008, p.48). In recognising the unavoidable limits of 
its explanatory capacity (Cilliers, 2002, p.78; 2005a, p.607), the complexity approach instead 
opts to not oversimplify the relations it attempts to model in situated circumstances, thus it 
takes account of emergence.  The complexity approach can therefore be distinguished from 
scientific reductionism in that it is self-critical of its own reductionism; it recognises 
reduction as an unavoidable consequence of the incompressible complexity of social reality 
(Cilliers, 2002, p.78; 2005a, p.607).  It does not aspire towards reductionism, as is the case 
for the scientific method, it simply accepts the fact of incompressibility and necessary 
reduction (Cilliers, 1998, pp.1-2; see further Richardson, 2005). 
Conversely, although it has been argued that ‘the autopoietic environment is always more 
complex than the system’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, pp.68-69), this is only a 
recognition that the individual, functionally-differentiated sub-systems of society are less 
complex than the overall autopoietic social environment, and similarly that society continues 
on outside autopoietic society.  The autopoietic approach, while acknowledging that the act 
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of modelling society as autopoietic reduces the complexity of the account offered, it does not 
act to mitigate the effects of this reduction.  This is revealed in the totalising nature of the 
specific accounts offered by each sub-system of their particular field; for example, within the 
autopoietic legal system it is argued that all that is to do with law is contemplated within that 
system (King, 1993, p.223; 2009, p.72; Luhmann, 1989, pp.141-142; 1992a, pp.1427-1428; 
Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.88).  This implies that the boundaries drawn for the 
purposes of analysis in autopoiesis are not based on consideration of resources, but merely on 
the methodology (functional differentiation) used to create them.  Moreover, while the legal 
system may continue on outside of autopoietic society, the claim is that functional 
differentiation provides an accurate representation of that system, such that the autopoietic 
representation becomes the de facto real representation (made more so by the construction of 
the real social, within the autopoietic social!).  It appears that the acknowledgment in the 
autopoietic approach of the reductive nature of modelling, which must form a part of an anti-
reductionist position, is superficial.  Internally, the autopoietic approach offers complete 
accounts of its sub-systems, such that the reductive nature of functional differentiation is not 
considered (Ruhl, 1996, n.4 p.852 and pp.901-906). 
EMERGENTISM 
As I have said, an approach which possesses anti-reductionist qualities is also likely to 
display emergentist characteristics.  Thus, both the complexity and autopoietic approaches 
make use of emergence, although it is more clearly acknowledged and significantly more 
developed in the former than the latter.  The complexity approach to boundary is emergent 
because it does not merely mark the limits of the system’s function, but is instead ‘both a 
function of the system and of our description strategy’ (Cilliers, 1998, p.4; 2001, p.141).  In 
this formulation, the boundary is viewed as being comprised of the interactions between the 
system, the observer’s attempt to delineate the boundaries of the system, and other elements 
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in the environment of the system and the observer.  Consequently, the nature of the boundary 
cannot be derived simply by comparing the various propositions for the location of the 
boundary and averaging them (recalling the problematic linearity of c + k = do).  Conversely, 
autopoietic systems determine the boundary internally, as a self-production.  The external 
observer has a role in defining what they wish to investigate, but this account does not play a 
direct role in the understanding of boundary generated by functional differentiation; there is 
no link between system and observer over boundary production.  Instead, the emergent 
quality of autopoietic systems appears (unsurprisingly) to be an internal one.  Autopoiesis 
makes use of a different term to describe emergence though, self-organisation.  As the system 
generates communications about events it encounters it is compelled to organise them into 
some coherent account of self in order to continue to deal with further events and 
communications.  The system identity which comes about through these self-organising 
processes is arguably an emergent one, although it is not something which appears to be 
discussed in the literature on autopoiesis.  This may explain why the generation of an 
emergent identity in autopoiesis appears to be incidental, an accident. 
The central criticism offered by the complexity approach on the basis of emergence in 
relation to the autopoietic construction of the boundary is that the emergence found therein is 
incidental.  The character of the system as a whole appears to be brought about by the piling 
up of more and more communications.  This is merely the accumulation of information (see 
King and Schütz, 1994, p.270) and does not consider the emergent consequences of the 
interactions between these communications as the constitutive elements of the system.  While 
Maturana and Varela argue that an autopoietic system can be defined as ‘a composite unity’ 
(Maturana, 1980, p.29 in Mingers, 1995, p.15), this only suggests that the collection of parts 
makes the whole.  Although interaction is mentioned in the definition of the system 
(Maturana 1978, p.32 in Mingers, 1995, p.14), this is not conceived of in the same way as 
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complexity theory.  The sole purpose of the interaction is to make more of the participating 
parts, not to create new entities and characteristics distinct from, and perhaps not even 
present, in those parts (see Mingers, 1995, p.15, cf. Vermeule, 2012, p.9).  Proponents of the 
autopoietic approach instead state that the system is everything which is not environment.  
Thus the environment is both the system’s ‘negative correlative’ and ‘a contingent state of the 
system’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.80).  The first element here suggests that the 
system can be defined simply by subtracting system “s” from environment “e” to derive the 
boundary “b” (e - s = b).  The second element confirms this suggesting that what is currently 
environment could become system, and what is system could become environment.  This in 
essence treats the system as simply the sum of its parts (communications), which are 
themselves only part of the broader whole of the environment. 
If the autopoietic system is to be derived from the summing of its parts then the autopoietic 
environment also possesses this characteristic.  The premise of functional differentiation is 
that it is possible for the autopoietic account to deal with every niche of social existence 
(even if this requires further differentiation) totally.  Thus, were one to gather all social 
communications, one would theoretically have a full autopoietic account of the social 
(acknowledging that this account operates only from an autopoietic perspective and therefore 
only offers one account of the social as a whole).  There is no question of whether 
communications might interact at the level of the social environment because 
communications originating in different systems cannot communicate with one another.  This 
returns me to the conclusion that the existence of emergentism in autopoiesis is incidental.  It 
occurs internally to the extent that the identity of the system might be said to emerge from the 
collection of communications, however it is not addressed in this way in the literature.  Even 
if it were, this would not appear as emergence from the perspective of the complexity 
approach because other elements of autopoiesis suggest that the system’s boundary can be 
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derived by examining what is not system (b = e – s).  However, as I said, it appears that the 
literature simply does not comment on the notion of emergence.  Thus, rather than a flaw in 
autopoiesis, the absence of emergence could be treated more positively as an unexplored 
absence. 
However, functional differentiation presents a problem here.  The legal system’s 
understanding of the social as a whole is limited by and to its functional understanding; 
function defines what is included and excluded from the system by the boundary (Luhmann, 
1989, p.141).  Relatedly, society, understood as an autopoietic system, must only be able to 
understand social interaction in a limited number of ways (those permitted by functional 
differentiation).  This would continue to be the case even if society were to differentiate itself 
in new ways.  This seems to be the epitome of reductionism; the deliberate (as opposed to 
coincidental) limiting of variables which fall to be considered.  The solution is simply to 
extend the notion of emergence from the system’s internal account of itself (where the 
collection of communications is viewed as interactive leading to an as-yet unaddressed 
emergent quality to the identity of the system), to the differentiation of society.  The precise 
means for achieving this must almost certainly originate in some form of inter-system 
interaction, which is problematic for autopoiesis, but perhaps not insurmountable.  
Regardless, the answer to that question is the subject for another paper. 
Each approach demonstrates a degree of anti-reductionist and emergentist sentiment; 
however, these features are, of course, significantly more developed in the complexity 
approach.  Thus, the critique the complexity approach offers relates to the under-
development, and under-investigation of these ideas in autopoiesis.  The approaches lead to 
differing ways of constructing the boundary in each instance.  For complexity, the boundary 
must be the emergent product of interaction between the observer, system and environment.  
For autopoiesis, the observer is somewhat irrelevant (although they are free to construct their 
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own autopoietic account of the system, it simply does not interact with the system’s own 
account), instead the system constructs its boundary internally.  It was argued that the identity 
(the boundary) which arises could be thought of as emergent, but other elements of 
autopoietic thought on boundary construction appear to block this proposition.  Nonetheless, 
it was suggested that the incorporation of consideration about emergence into autopoietic 
thought is possible. 
INTERFACE 
Each approach envisages a different purpose for the boundary.  While the natural role of any 
boundary is to distinguish one thing from another, the boundary can also take on a role in 
relation to how it contributes to a system’s attempts to deal with the environment.  There is 
clear difference between the two approaches in this regard which builds on the previous 
observations made of each.  I argue that the complexity approach views the role of the 
boundary as a flexible facilitator, intended to distinguish one thing from another but not in a 
confining way.  Conversely, the autopoietic boundary adopts the role of filtrator of noise, 
casting the boundary as an internal lens which ignores (indeed, is blind to) that which the 
system considers irrelevant, creating the space for the self-construction of relevancies within 
itself. 
The complexity understanding of the boundary as flexible facilitator stems from two 
characteristics of the boundary, that of the boundary as interface, and of the boundary as 
being spatially ambiguous.  Cilliers has suggested that the behaviour of the boundary as 
interface is somewhat analogous to that of an eardrum.  The eardrum is a boundary which 
separates the inner and outer ears while also permitting the conduction of the sound waves, 
yet in its absence ‘the sound waves would not be able to get through at all’ (2001, p.141).  
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Thus, the boundary as eardrum facilitates the interaction between environment and system.  If 
some other form of boundary was present, or equally if there was no boundary at all, there 
would be no method to interface the system with its environment.  Here the boundary is 
central to the interacting relationship between system, environment, and other systems 
therein. 
The boundary is also spatially ambiguous.  By this I mean that the boundary is a contingent, 
emergent outcome of the interaction between the system’s understanding of boundary, that of 
the observer, and that of the environment (or some mixture of these interacting parts) (Cilliers 
2001, p.141).  Whereas the eardrum analogy suggests a fixed boundary this is not the case.  
Instead, boundary position varies depending on context, rendering what is internal and 
external to the interface open to contestation based on observer/system context.  If the 
position and character of the boundary is ambiguous, then it is theoretically possible, and 
indeed plausible, for multiple boundaries to overlap and intersect within and across 
perceptions of systems (Cilliers, 2001, p.142).  Furthermore, because the existence of the 
boundary is premised on interaction, and because complex interaction implies the need for a 
richly interconnected collection of parts, this suggests that the distance between any given 
part inside a construction and the outside is likely to be short (Cilliers, 2001, p.142), while 
also being indeterminate.  We can think of the boundary as being ‘folded in’ to create these 
short routes, ‘or perhaps the system consists of boundaries only’ (Cilliers, 2001, p.142).  
There may be overlap, intersection, and sharing, and there will always be interaction that 
must be mediated by the emergent, contingent interface that is the boundary.  This account of 
boundary views it not as a device to separate and segregate systems, observations or 




In view of this, the unfixed nature of the boundary in the complexity approach might be 
thought of as being a multiplicity of boundaries situated in unique contexts borne out of the 
system’s interactions with many different observers, systems, and aspects of the environment 
(again see Cilliers, 2001, p.142).  For law this results in the possibility of many overlapping, 
intersecting notions of boundary, none of which can be defined as objectively correct.  These 
overlaps appear both practically in appeal court rulings which produce multiple judgments, 
yet also less tangibly in academic debates about the scope of law and legal inquiry (for 
example, what is sovereignty?  What is legitimate constitutional authority?  How do we 
identify a human right?).  I noted earlier that the system might be thought of as just 
boundaries, this seems partly accurate.  It might be more appropriate to say that the system 
can be thought of as many competing definitions of its boundary (cf. Luhmann 1992a, 
p.1426).  What these competing understandings of boundary offer is the possibility of 
engagement, of interface between differing accounts by varied observers (see Cilliers, 1998, 
p.120).  Thus, the spatial ambiguity of the system’s boundaries under complexity theory turns 
out to be another aspect of its facilitating character.  The boundary acts as an interface 
allowing the production of individual interactions between observer and system, of many 
interactions between observers’ differing accounts of the system, and of the on-going 
interaction that these interactions themselves generate (cf. Luhmann 1992a, p.1419).  As with 
the eardrum, in the absence of the boundary acting as facilitator the complexity approach 
argues that none of this would be possible. 
The autopoietic approach also suggests that the boundary performs a facilitating role, but it 
does this through a different series of actions; hence the argument that it filtrates rather than 
facilitates when compared with the complexity theory approach.  Whereas the facilitating 
action permits the boundary to link up components such that they can engage with one 
another, without preconditioning either of the positions, the filtration action of ‘separating 
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and connecting’ (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.46) implies a more active 
involvement in joining parts of the system together selectively through ‘preferential 
interactions’ (Maturana, 1980, p.29 in Mingers, 1995, p.15).  This is the consequence of the 
internally constructed nature of the autopoietic boundary; the system accepts no ‘external 
determination nor, of course, any external delimitation whatsoever’ in the construction of the 
boundary (Luhmann, 1992a, p.1425).  In the case of the legal system, the law defines its own 
boundaries through the recursive application of its communications to further 
communications (Luhmann, 1989, p.142).  Thus, the legal system separates and connects 
communications by defining what is and is not law for the purposes of constructing the 
system’s boundary through the process of recursive application of communication to 
communication.  The internality of this activity should not be forgotten either.  While the 
legal system translates ‘whatever is out there… into whatever can fit in here’, that 
information was always ‘latently already in’ the system (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, 
p.88).  This is an act of ‘internal crossing’, which the system constructs itself 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2010, p.81; see also Luhmann 1992a, p.1432).  Thus, the 
boundary as filter is not positioned between the system and the external environment, but 
within the system between system and the system’s imagined reconstruction of the external 
environment. 
While both approaches suggest that the role of the boundary is to act as an interface between 
system, environment and observers, the way in which the boundary conducts this engagement 
differs significantly.  The autopoietic approach argues that the system’s boundary is 
determined solely by the system (although the appearance of the choices it is presented with 
which lead to such a construction may be outside of its control).  Indeed, Luhmann argues 
that a system which does not know its own boundaries is not really a system at all (Luhmann 
1992a, p.1419)  Conversely, the complexity approach views the production of boundaries as 
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the consequence of many interactions, and holds that the vast majority of the outcomes of 
such interactions are far outside of the system’s own control.  One approach offers relative 
certainty (internally) about the shape of the system, whereas the other appears to result in the 
conclusion that there is no singular “system” at all, but understandings of system boundary. 
It appears we are being offered either predictability of uncertainty, but this is not quite 
correct.  Complexity theorists have suggested that a more appropriate conceptualisation of the 
‘interface’ (Cilliers, 2001, p.141) between context and understanding requires one to ‘fake 
positivism’ (Richardson, et al, 2001a, p.16; 2001b, p.44) at appropriate times; when ‘we are 
forced to take a position’ (Richardson, et al, 2001a, p.16).  This means that reasoning must be 
conducted through an ostensibly objective framework even though both one’s use of it, and 
its products, will be provisional and local (see Webb, 2005, p.231).  For example, in order for 
legal judgments to be actionable we have to act as if they are objective.  While a judge may 
offer a clear and comprehensive judgment, this can only ever be a concrete description of the 
law in that specific context, from the judge’s own perspective.  In all other contexts, for 
example in the application of the ruling, or the interpretation of the precedent’s meaning to 
future cases by subsequent advocates and courts, the meaning will change.  Acceptance of 
this is significantly aided by the formalisation of the legal process, because it establishes a 
framework in which to conceptualise disagreement broadly understood by most participants 
in the system, and which remains actionable because we all follow it. 
Therefore, the complexity approach does not promise predictability (Cilliers, 2005b, p.256; 
Heylighen et al., 2007, p.130, Preiser and Cilliers, 2010, p.269), it orientates itself to expect 
disagreement, disunity, and a need to negotiate the boundary (Cilliers, 1998, p.120).  This is 
almost certainly a more appropriate representation of the overall character of boundary 
construction in the social environment as a whole.  While the system under a complexity 
approach might construct its own idea of boundary following autopoiesis, that method is not 
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sustainable beyond the internal thoughts of the system, or observer.  Beyond the system (to 
the extent that we can even think of there being a single system, or a beyond (Cilliers 1998, 4; 
2001, 141; Richardson et al. 2001a, 9, 2001b pp.63-64)) interaction seems to be the only 
feasible way of taking a system forward, of getting anything new into the system and 
generating further energy.  Thus, the role of the boundary as filtrator in autopoiesis is 
important, the system needs a way to decide what it will and will not pay attention too (be 
this internally constructed or otherwise).  However, from that position it then must facilitate 
something more than just the separation and connection of internal parts and internally 
imagined externalities.  Structural coupling in autopoiesis, initially ‘conspicuous by its 
absence’ (Mingers, 1995, p.147), represents an acknowledgment within the self-referentially 
orientated framework of autopoiesis that interaction is an unavoidable necessity in society.  
Yet the tool itself is hampered by the internally orientated construct within which it operates.  
Conversely, the complexity approach of facilitating interconnection and interaction between 
the system, observers, other systems, and the environment generally, offers a significantly 
more effective (and less conceptually awkward) means of interfacing and interacting parts.  
However, acceptance of this element must entail recognition that contingency and 
emergence, as imagined by the complexity theory approach, have a part to play in the 
construction of boundaries. 
CONCLUSION 
In closing I want to make some remarks about what the complexity approach offers to 
autopoiesis, and the separate utility of the complexity approach to systems theory thinking in 
law.  I hope it has been clear that I did not intend to orientate my critique towards any 
particular “school” of autopoiesis.  However, it is not targeted at the theory’s more orthodox 
supporters against whom many accurate, but by now well-rehearsed, arguments have been 
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made (dealt with in King, 2001).  My argument rests on the understanding that there is 
something in the character of autopoietic theory generally which a complexity approach can 
comment on.  This is perhaps most appropriately described as a difference of ethos which I 
have argued is manifested in the portrayal of the boundary.  
The complexity approach to the boundary as a contingent, emergent, interface, and therefore 
as a somewhat unquantifiable, uncertain phenomenon which appears to exist in many varied 
contexts simultaneously presents something useful to autopoiesis.  At present, the autopoietic 
approach is heavily reliant on self-construction, and self-reference.  While this approach may 
be appropriate when considering an individual system from a single, isolated perspective 
(indeed, it can be a highly effective analytical tool), it is insufficient on its own beyond this.  
The understanding of boundary entailed in the complexity theory approach demonstrates that 
when one expands consideration to either multiple understandings of a system between varied 
elements of that system (because neither autopoietic nor complex systems are internally 
uniform), or to the effects brought about by the interaction of individual understandings of 
boundary between differing systems (for example, a law as proposed by the legal system and 
experienced by the health system), the autopoietic approach is not enough.  In either example, 
the effect of the presence of multiple perspectives needs to be worked out, but this is not 
achievable within the autopoietic approach.  Each has an understanding of what it thinks this 
is, but this is isolationist, reductionist.  What is needed is a means of explaining what might 
be the product of those two understandings interacting; this is what the complexity approach 
offers legal autopoiesis.   
For law, and legal systems theory thinking, complexity theory therefore offers an alternative 
to the autopoietic understanding of systems.  The very understanding of “system” has been 
shown to vary between the two approaches.  In autopoiesis the legal system is relatively sure 
of its shape and character, as it is defined self-referentially and constructed internally.  The 
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complexity approach defines the legal system from a different perspective, as a consequence 
of many competing understandings of its boundary.  The orientation of the complexity 
approach, coupled with the new tools it brings with it (contingency, emergence, interface), 
offer a tangibly different way of assessing legal constructions (from both an internal and 
external perspective) to that offered by autopoiesis, or indeed any other approach. 
It would be wrong to take from this that complexity theory, a hitherto relatively unknown 
systems theory, is perfect; the complexity approach recognises the boundaries of its 
explanatory capacity (Richardson, et al., 2001a, p.9).  Indeed, complexity theory holds that 
boundary drawing represents a reduction of complexity by participants in order to form 
models to make sense of the world (Cilliers, 2002, pp.78-84; 2005a, p.606).  In order to 
express our understandings of the world we have to reduce the complexity of our models 
(Cilliers, 2002, p.78), and this has the effect of distorting our perceptions of reality (Cilliers, 
2005a, pp.608-609; 2007, p.161).  Any single account will thus miss out elements of the 
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 It is important not to conflate Luhmann’s use of the word complexity with that of complexity theory. 
Complexity theory is a systems theory independent of autopoiesis, which actively distinguishes between 
complexity and complicatedness.  Something is complicated when there are a great many parts that fulfil a 
particular function when they are connected together in a specific way (for e.g. a jet airliner or a 10,000 piece 
puzzle).  Conversely, something which is complex, or which displays the characteristic of complexity, possesses 
a great many parts which interact with one another in a multiplicity of ways.  The character of the whole is not 
derived from the parts’ individual characteristics but from the emergent properties that become apparent only 
through their interaction.  Therefore, although Luhmann has discussed “complexity,” and associated notions 
such as contingency (see Luhmann, 1985, pp24-31) this was not complexity theory and appears more akin to 
complicatedness as the ‘progressive accumulating’ of parts (King and Schutz, 1994, p.270). 
2
 On knowledge and information in complexity theory see Cilliers, 2002, p80.  On the contingent construction of 
meaning see Webb, 2005, note 19 p231 
